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Collateral value and forbearance lending


  • Chen, Nan-Kuang
  • Chu, Hsiao-Lei


We investigate the foreclosure policy of collateral-based loans in which the endogenous collateral value plays a crucial role. If creditors are able to commit, then the equilibrium arrangement is more likely to feature forebearance lending by specifying a lower level of liquidation (or roll over all of the loans) relative to the expost efficiency criterion for each realization of the interim signal. The key is that collateral value may drop too low when banks call in loans by auctioning off borrowers¿ collateral and this makes clearing up non-performing loans less attractive. We attribute the banks¿ leniency as we have observed in Japan during the 1990s to an equilibrium arrangement where banks can commit due to either relationship banking or an implicit lenderborrower contract, such as the arrangement under Japan¿s main-bank system.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei, 2003. "Collateral value and forbearance lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20004, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:20004

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
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    14. Sekine, Toshitaka & Kobayashi, Keiichiro & Saita, Yumi, 2003. "Forbearance Lending: The Case of Japanese Firms," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 21(2), pages 69-92, August.
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    18. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Lepetit, Laetitia & Strobel, Frank & Dickinson, David G., 2012. "Does uncertainty matter for loan charge-offs?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 264-277.
    2. Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei & Liu, Jin-Tan & Wang, Kuang-Hsien, 2006. "Collateral value, firm borrowing, and forbearance lending: an empirical study of Taiwan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-71, January.

    More about this item


    Collateral value; forbearance lending; government guarantee.;

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy


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