IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/20004.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Collateral value and forbearance lending

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Nan-Kuang
  • Chu, Hsiao-Lei

Abstract

We investigate the foreclosure policy of collateral-based loans in which the endogenous collateral value plays a crucial role. If creditors are able to commit, then the equilibrium arrangement is more likely to feature forebearance lending by specifying a lower level of liquidation (or roll over all of the loans) relative to the expost efficiency criterion for each realization of the interim signal. The key is that collateral value may drop too low when banks call in loans by auctioning off borrowers¿ collateral and this makes clearing up non-performing loans less attractive. We attribute the banks¿ leniency as we have observed in Japan during the 1990s to an equilibrium arrangement where banks can commit due to either relationship banking or an implicit lenderborrower contract, such as the arrangement under Japan¿s main-bank system.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei, 2003. "Collateral value and forbearance lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20004, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:20004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20004/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
    2. Chen, Nan-Kuang, 2001. "Bank net worth, asset prices and economic activity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 415-436, October.
    3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
    4. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    6. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    7. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," CID Working Papers 21, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    8. Thomas F. Cargill & Michael M. Hutchison & Takatoshi Ito, 1997. "The Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032473, April.
    9. Carlstrom, Charles T & Fuerst, Timothy S, 1997. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 893-910, December.
    10. McKinnon, Ronald I. & Pill, Huw, 1998. "International Overborrowing: A Decomposition of Credit and Currency Risks," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 1267-1282, July.
    11. Sekine, Toshitaka & Kobayashi, Keiichiro & Saita, Yumi, 2003. "Forbearance Lending: The Case of Japanese Firms," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 21(2), pages 69-92, August.
    12. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1998. "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Working Papers 6606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Kim, Yong Jin & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2002. "Overinvestment, collateral lending, and economic crisis," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 181-201, April.
    14. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1997. "Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 807-817, April.
    15. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 841-879.
    16. repec:bla:etrans:v:9:y:2001:i:1:p:1-27 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
    18. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," CID Working Papers 21A, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    19. Janet Mitchell, 2000. "Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(1), pages 59-100, March.
    20. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, 2000. "The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will It End?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, pages 129-212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Mr. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," IMF Working Papers 2000/092, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Mori, Naruki & Shiratsuka, Shigenori & Taguchi, Hiroo, 2001. "Policy Responses to the Post-bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(S1), pages 53-102, February.
    23. Xu, Cheng-Gang & Maskin, Eric, 2001. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2715, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Chung Yi Tse & Charles Ka Yui Leung, 2002. "Increasing Wealth and Increasing Instability: The Role of Collateral," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 45-52, February.
    25. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 2001. "A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 489-517.
    26. Mitchell, Janet, 1998. "Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1780, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lepetit, Laetitia & Strobel, Frank & Dickinson, David G., 2012. "Does uncertainty matter for loan charge-offs?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 264-277.
    2. Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei & Liu, Jin-Tan & Wang, Kuang-Hsien, 2006. "Collateral value, firm borrowing, and forbearance lending: an empirical study of Taiwan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-71, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei & Liu, Jin-Tan & Wang, Kuang-Hsien, 2006. "Collateral value, firm borrowing, and forbearance lending: an empirical study of Taiwan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-71, January.
    2. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    3. Adriano A. Rampini, 2019. "Financing Durable Assets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(2), pages 664-701, February.
    4. Ilhyock Shim & Goetz Von Peter, 2007. "Distress Selling and Asset Market Feedback," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(5), pages 243-291, December.
    5. Goldstein, Itay & Razin, Assaf, 2015. "Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 10(2), pages 113-180, 30.
    6. Martin Andreasen & Marcelo Ferman & Pawel Zabczyk, 2013. "The Business Cycle Implications of Banks' Maturity Transformation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 581-600, October.
    7. Kato, Ryo, 2006. "Liquidity, infinite horizons and macroeconomic fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1105-1130, July.
    8. Leung, Charles, 2004. "Macroeconomics and housing: a review of the literature," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 249-267, December.
    9. Meisenzahl, Ralf R., 2014. "Verifying the state of financing constraints: Evidence from U.S. business credit contracts," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 58-77.
    10. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    11. Xu, Cheng-Gang & Maskin, Eric, 2001. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2715, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Kolecek, Ludek, 2008. "Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 40-61, April.
    13. Nan-Kuang Chen & Charles Leung, 2008. "Asset Price Spillover, Collateral and Crises: with an Application to Property Market Policy," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 351-385, November.
    14. Goetz von Peter, 2003. "A Unified Approach to Credit Crunches, Financial Instability, and Banking Crises," Macroeconomics 0312006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Mit, 2010. "Lemons, Market Shutdowns and Learning," 2010 Meeting Papers 1098, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    17. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    18. Augusto De La Torre & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2004. "Coping with Risks through Mismatches: Domestic and International Financial Contracts for Emerging Economies," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 349-390, December.
    19. Toyofuku, Kenta, 2013. "Stability or restructuring? Macroeconomic dynamics under soft budget constraint problems," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 625-649.
    20. Raphael Solomon, 2004. "When Bad Things Happen to Good Banks: Contagious Bank Runs and Currency Crises," Staff Working Papers 04-18, Bank of Canada.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collateral value; forbearance lending; government guarantee.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:20004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.