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The Mortgage Financial Crises: The Role of Credit Risk Management and Corporate Governance

Author

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  • Lang, William W.

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)

  • Jagtiani, Julapa

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)

Abstract

This paper discusses the role of risk management and corporate governance as causal factors in the onset of the financial crisis. The downturn in the housing and mortgage markets precipitated the first phase of the financial crisis in August 2007 when the solvency of a number of large financial firms was threatened by huge losses in complex structured financial securities. Why did these firms have such high concentrations in mortgage-related securities? Given the information available to firms at the time, these high concentrations in mortgage-related securities violated basic principles of modern risk management. We argue that this failure was a result of principal-agent problems internal to the firms and to breakdowns of corporate governance systems designed to overcome these principal-agent problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Lang, William W. & Jagtiani, Julapa, 2010. "The Mortgage Financial Crises: The Role of Credit Risk Management and Corporate Governance," Working Papers 10-12, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:upafin:10-12
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    File URL: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/10/10-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul S. Mills & John Kiff, 2007. "Money for Nothing and Checks for Free; Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets," IMF Working Papers 07/188, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ravi Kumar, P. & Ravi, V., 2007. "Bankruptcy prediction in banks and firms via statistical and intelligent techniques - A review," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 180(1), pages 1-28, July.
    3. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1996. "The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 78(1), pages 1-15, February.
    4. John Kiff & Jennifer A. Elliott & Elias G. Kazarian & Jodi G Scarlata & Carolyne Spackman, 2009. "Credit Derivatives; Systemic Risks and Policy Options?," IMF Working Papers 09/254, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, 2011. "Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 1848-1880.
    6. Gustavo A. Suarez & Daniel M. Covitz & J. Nellie Liang, 2009. "The evolution of a financial crisis: panic in the asset-backed commercial paper market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), revised 2009.
    7. Giovanni Dell’ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 367-384, March.
    8. Christopher Mayer & Karen Pence & Shane M. Sherlund, 2009. "The Rise in Mortgage Defaults," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 27-50, Winter.
    9. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496.
    10. Jose Giancarlo Gasha & Andre O Santos & Jorge A Chan-Lau & Carlos I. Medeiros & Marcos R Souto & Christian Capuano, 2009. "Recent Advances in Credit Risk Modeling," IMF Working Papers 09/162, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Carlos O. Arteta & Mark S. Carey & Ricardo Correa & Jason Kotter, 2008. "Which banks sponsored ABCP vehicles and why?," Proceedings 1072, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin Allen & Itay Goldstein & Julapa Jagtiani & William W. Lang, 2016. "Enhancing Prudential Standards in Financial Regulations," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 133-149, June.
    2. Donnelly, Grant & Iyer, Ravi & Howell, Ryan T., 2012. "The Big Five personality traits, material values, and financial well-being of self-described money managers," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1129-1142.
    3. Michel Magnan & Garen Markarian, 2011. "Accounting, Governance and the Crisis: Is Risk the Missing Link?," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 215-231.
    4. Hussein Tarraf, 2011. "The Role Of Corporate Governance In The Events Leading Up To The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis Of Aggressive Risk-Taking," Global Journal of Business Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 5(4), pages 93-105.
    5. repec:pje:journl:article27winii is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Meredith Williams & Yilin Huang & Lawrence R. Cordell, 2011. "Collateral damage: Sizing and assessing the subprime CDO crisis," Working Papers 11-30, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 2011.
    7. Lam, Alexis Lam Man Yee, 2019. "An analysis of the effect between firm's performance and determinant of liquidity ratio of Revlon Incorporation in cosmetic industry," MPRA Paper 97281, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Nov 2019.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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