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Agency Theory and Bank Governance: A Study of the Effectiveness of CEO's Remuneration for Risk Taking

Author

Listed:
  • Gérard Mondello

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

  • Nissaf Ben Ayed

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

Abstract

This article studies the links between governance and risk-taking in banks. For the agency theory, when information are asymmetric, the disciplinary mechanisms of governance have a moderating effect on the remuneration policy and, consequently, the managers' choice concerning the balance between assets' revenue and risk. The following model shows that: i) The presence of effective disciplinary mechanisms does not reduce the latitude of managers to award themselves a high level of wages; ii) This binds the control of risk-taking through remuneration structures. Remuneration is not a determining factor in explaining risk-taking. iii) Contrary to the agency theory's teaching, excessive risk-taking is not induced by asymmetric information.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Mondello & Nissaf Ben Ayed, 2020. "Agency Theory and Bank Governance: A Study of the Effectiveness of CEO's Remuneration for Risk Taking," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-03, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency theory; Bank governance; information asymmetry; CEO's remuneration; bank risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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