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Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

  • Emanuele Ciriolo

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.

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File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/13628/1/dul-0092.pdf
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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series DULBEA Working Papers with number 05-20.RS.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Publication status: Published by: ULB, DULBEA
Handle: RePEc:dul:wpaper:05-20rs
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
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