Fixed-Term Contracts, Incentives and Effort
This paper focuses on labor market transitions and especially on those involvingfixed-term contracts. Our contribution is twofold: first, we provide an accuratemeasure of labor market transitions; second, we analyze the potential incentive effectof fixed-term contracts on “effort”. To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we use adynamic multinomial logit with fixed effects. We construct an indicator of effort forfixed-term workers, which is basically “working more than siblings”. Using Frenchdata, we find that a fixed-term contract provides significantly better perspectivesthan unemployment, but no evidence of any significant impact of exerting effort onthe probability of getting an open-ended contract.
|Date of creation:||2009|
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