A Model of Equilibrium Institutions
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- Kevin Sheedy & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2011. "A model of equilibrium institutions," 2011 Meeting Papers 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D., 2012. "A model of equilibrium institutions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 42017, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy, 2012. "A Model of Equilibrium Institutions," CEP Discussion Papers dp1123, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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Cited by:
- Leonardo Becchetti & Riccardo Massari & Paolo Naticchioni, 2014.
"The drivers of happiness inequality: suggestions for promoting social cohesion,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 419-442.
- Leonardo Becchetti & Riccardo Massari & Paolo Naticchioni, 2011. "The drivers of happiness inequality: Suggestions for promoting social cohesion," Working Papers 2011-06, Universita' di Cassino, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche.
- Becchetti, Leonardo & Massari, Riccardo & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2013. "The Drivers of Happiness Inequality: Suggestions for Promoting Social Cohesion," IZA Discussion Papers 7153, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Yang, Jidong & Liu, Kai & Zhang, Yiran, 2015. "Happiness Inequality in China," MPRA Paper 66623, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2012.
"Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence,"
Working Paper Series
rwp12-058, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo V. Guimaraes, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 19028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Campante, Filipe & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimarães, Bernardo, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9284, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Campante, Filipe Robin & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2013. "Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence," Textos para discussão 323, FGV/EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence," Sciences Po publications 10, Sciences Po.
- Tim Willems & Shaun Larcom & Mare Sarr, 2013. "What shall we do with the bad dictator?," Economics Series Working Papers 671, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Leonardo Becchetti & Riccardo Massari & Paolo Naticchioni, 2010. "Why has happiness inequality increased? Suggestions for promoting social cohesion," Working Papers 177, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
More about this item
Keywords
institutions; political economy; power struggle; property rights; time inconsistency;JEL classification:
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2012-03-28 (Macroeconomics)
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