What shall we do with the bad dictator?
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More about this item
Keywordsdictatorship; time-inconsistency; International Criminal Court; amnesty; institutions;
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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