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Determinants of Compensation in the Financial Services Industry

  • Patrick Kampkoetter

    (University of Cologne)

We provide an extensive overview of the determinants of the fixed and variable compensation schemes in the German and Swiss financial services industry. We find that the financial crisis had a deep impact on the proportion of variable pay to fixed salary; this impact was caused by large individual bonus cuts. The results also show that fixed compensation packages are highly standardized between banks, whereas bonus payments are more strongly related to differences between individuals. In Germany, bonuses vary to a higher extent across companies, whereas in Swiss banks, the differences are almost negligible when adding firm controls.

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Paper provided by Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences in its series Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series with number 03-12.

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Date of creation: 09 Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cgr:cgsser:03-12
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