Managerial pay and firm performance -- Danish evidence
This study examines the determinants of managerial compensation in a sample of Danish firms, and tests hypotheses derived from agency theory in the seldom studied (European) institutional setting of relationship-oriented governance systems. We find pay-performance sensitivity similar to that found in other settings, small differences in sensitivity across management levels, and no evidence in support of the career concern hypothesis.
Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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