Managerial pay and firm performance -- Danish evidence
This study examines the determinants of managerial compensation in a sample of Danish firms, and tests hypotheses derived from agency theory in the seldom studied (European) institutional setting of relationship-oriented governance systems. We find pay-performance sensitivity similar to that found in other settings, small differences in sensitivity across management levels, and no evidence in support of the career concern hypothesis.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/872/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/872/bibliographic|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:scaman:v:16:y:2000:i:3:p:269-286. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.