Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence
This study examines the determinants of managerial compensation in a sample of Danish firms testing hypothesis derived from agency theory in the seldomly studied (European) institutional setting of relationship-oriented governance systems. We find pay-performance sensitivity similar to that found in other settings, small differences in sensitivity across individual levels and no evidence in support of the career concern hypothesis.
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