Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover
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- Eriksson, Tor & Lausten, Mette, 2000.
"Managerial pay and firm performance -- Danish evidence,"
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- Erikson, T. & Lausten, M., 1997. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Papers 97-11, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
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- Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
- Lausten, M., 1998. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance," Papers 98-10, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
- Denis, David J. & Sarin, Atulya, 1999. "Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 187-223, May.
- Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988.
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- Giorgio Brunello & Clara Graziano & Bruno Parigi, 1999.
"Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?,"
1999.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2000. "Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?," IZA Discussion Papers 105, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
- Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
- Eriksson, Tor, 1999. "Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 262-80, April.
- Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-46, June.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter.
- Jeremy Edwards & Marcus Nibler, 2000. "Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 237-267, October.
- Colin Mayer, 1996. "Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 164, OECD Publishing.
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