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The Value Relevance of Top Executive Departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

Author

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  • Cools, Kees

    (University of Groningen)

  • van Praag, Mirjam C.

    (Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock price effects due to the simultaneous occurrence of the positive real effect of monitoring and the opposing information effect. (ii) The combination of board monitoring and monitoring by other parties prevents assessing the value relevance of board monitoring in isolation. (iii) The confounding effect of a simultaneous successor appointment typically generates an upward biased estimate. Based on an analysis of price effects and trading volumes at announcement, we conclude that monitoring by the supervisory board is valued by investors: Forced departures of executive directors, also without a successor appointment, are value relevant in the Netherlands where external control mechanisms and shareholder control were virtually absent in the period studied (1991-2000).

Suggested Citation

  • Cools, Kees & van Praag, Mirjam C., 2007. "The Value Relevance of Top Executive Departures: Evidence from the Netherlands," IZA Discussion Papers 3054, IZA Network @ LISER.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3054
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    Cited by:

    1. Shaen Corbet & Yang (Greg) Hou & Yang Hu & Les Oxley, 2022. "We Reddit in a Forum: The Influence of Message Boards on Firm Stability," Review of Corporate Finance, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 151-190, March.
    2. W Jane Cheung & Andrew B Jackson, 2013. "Chief Executive Officer departures and market uncertainty," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 38(2), pages 279-310, August.
    3. Reggy Hooghiemstra & Hans van Ees, 2011. "Uniformity as response to soft law: Evidence from compliance and non‐compliance with the Dutch corporate governance code," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 480-498, December.
    4. Kayas, Oliver G., 2023. "Workplace surveillance: A systematic review, integrative framework, and research agenda," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    5. repec:col:000108:011054 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Cziraki, P. & de Goeij, P. C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2010. "Insider Trading, Option Exercises and Private Benefits of Control (Revision of DP 2010-32)," Discussion Paper 2010-90, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Byrka-Kita, Katarzyna & Czerwiński, Mateusz & Ferris, Stephen P. & Preś-Perepeczo, Agnieszka & Wiśniewski, Tomasz, 2025. "CEO casting call: Investor attention to corporate leadership appointments," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Shubasini Sivapregasam & Aslam Izah Selamat & Norhuda Abdul Rahim & Junaina Muhammad, 2020. "Impact of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Succession Policy on CEO Turnover Announcement in Malaysia," Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance (AAMJAF), Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, vol. 16(1), pages 127-153.
    9. Andres Giraldo & Juan Mendoza & Andr�s Rosas & Dayana Tellez, 2013. "Managerial Turnover: Coach Dismissals and Team Performance in Colombia," Vniversitas Económica, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá, vol. 0(0), pages 1-23.
    10. Kind, Axel & Schläpfer, Yves, 2011. "Are forced CEO turnovers good or bad news?," Working papers 2011/10, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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