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Inflation, Default, and the Currency Composition of Sovereign Debt in Emerging Economies: Working Paper 2017-01

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  • Daniel Fried

Abstract

In emerging market economies, governments issue debt denominated both in their own currency and in foreign currencies. I develop a theory of the optimal composition of sovereign debt between local and foreign currencies. In a model with a micro-founded monetary framework a government controls monetary policy and has the ability to borrow from abroad using both local and foreign currency bonds. In this model, local currency bonds differ from foreign currency bonds in two important ways. Unlike foreign currency bonds, local currency bonds function as a contingent claim,

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  • Daniel Fried, 2017. "Inflation, Default, and the Currency Composition of Sovereign Debt in Emerging Economies: Working Paper 2017-01," Working Papers 52385, Congressional Budget Office.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbo:wpaper:52385
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    3. Ni, Yinan & Barth, James R. & Sun, Yanfei, 2022. "On the dynamic capital structure of nations: Theory and empirics," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Ricardo Sabbadini, 2017. "Overcoming the Original Sin: Gains from Local Currency External Debt," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2017_27, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).

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    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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