Populist Constitutional Backsliding and Judicial Independence: Evidence from Turkiye

The synthetic control method has emerged as a widely utilized empirical tool for estimating the causal effects of public policies, natural disasters, and other interventions on various economic, social, institutional, and political outcomes. In this study, we demonstrate the potential application of this method in empirical comparative law by estimating the impact of the 2010 constitutional referendum in Turkiye on the trajectory of judicial independence. By comparing Turkiye with a salient Mediterranean donor pool of countries that did not experience similar interventions during the period from 1987 to 2021, we provide evidence of a severe breakdown and erosion of judicial independence. This deterioration appears to be a direct response to the populist constitutional backsliding initiated by the government-orchestrated assault on the judiciary, which was carried out under the guise of judicial modernization in 2010, before the additional constitutional reforms in 2017.