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The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence

Author

Listed:
  • Bernd Hayo

    () (University of Marburg)

  • Stefan Voigt

    () (University of Hamburg, Institute of Law & Economics)

Abstract

We study the long-term and dynamic relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence using a large panel dataset covering up to 87 countries and as many as 61 years. In line with the prevailing theoretical view in the literature, our analysis shows a positive relationship between these variables. However, the magnitude of the relationship is quite small. The positive relationship between the two variables is primarily driven by non-OECD countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2018. "The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201833, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201833
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/paper_2018/33-2018_hayo.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2017. "Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle," ILE Working Paper Series 4, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    2. Kao, Chihwa, 1999. "Spurious regression and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 1-44, May.
    3. Joakim Westerlund, 2005. "New Simple Tests for Panel Cointegration," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 297-316.
    4. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2016. "Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-13.
    5. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
    6. Im, Kyung So & Pesaran, M. Hashem & Shin, Yongcheol, 2003. "Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 53-74, July.
    7. Engle, Robert & Granger, Clive, 2015. "Co-integration and error correction: Representation, estimation, and testing," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 39(3), pages 106-135.
    8. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg & Feld, Lars P., 2015. "Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 197-211.
    9. Johansen, Soren, 1992. "Testing weak exogeneity and the order of cointegration in UK money demand data," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 313-334, June.
    10. Granger, C W J, 1969. "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 424-438, July.
    11. Levin, Andrew & Lin, Chien-Fu & James Chu, Chia-Shang, 2002. "Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-24, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial independence; de facto; de jure; long-term panel data analysis; cointegration; Granger causality;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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