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Homophily and infections: static and dynamic effects

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  • Matteo Bizzarri
  • Fabrizio Panebianco
  • Paolo Pin

Abstract

We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in homophily when homophily is small, and decreasing when high), and on the cumulative number of infections generated by a deviation from the steady state (that, instead, is decreasing in homophily when homophily is small, and increasing when high). If immunization rates are endogenous, homophily has the opposite impact on the two groups. However, the sign of the group-level impact is the opposite if immunization is motivated by infection risk or by peer pressure. If motivations are group-specific, homophily can be harmful to both groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Bizzarri & Fabrizio Panebianco & Paolo Pin, 2023. "Homophily and infections: static and dynamic effects," Papers 2304.11934, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2304.11934
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    Cited by:

    1. Thuilliez, Josselin & Touré, Nouhoum, 2024. "Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    2. Josselin Thuilliez & Nouhoum Touré, 2024. "Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic," Post-Print hal-04490900, HAL.
    3. Josselin Thuilliez & Nouhoum Touré, 2024. "Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04490900, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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