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Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks

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  • Panebianco, Fabrizio
  • Verdier, Thierry

Abstract

We study cultural diffusion in a random network where the transition probabilities are determined by a cultural transmission technology with endogenous vertical transmission rates (à la Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We present a two-way epidemic model in which both the infection and the recovery rates are endogenous and depend on the topology of the network. We characterize two balancing conditions satisfied by the network degree distribution and the vertical transmission rate distribution to ensure the sustainability of long run cultural heterogeneity. We discuss the effects of cultural homophily and paternalistic motivations for cultural transmission on the persistence of steady state cultural diversity.

Suggested Citation

  • Panebianco, Fabrizio & Verdier, Thierry, 2017. "Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 155-176.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:155-176
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.006
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    Cited by:

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    2. Anufriev, Mikhail & Borissov, Kirill & Pakhnin, Mikhail, 2023. "Dissonance minimization and conversation in social networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 167-191.
    3. Olcina, Gonzalo & Panebianco, Fabrizio & Zenou, Yves, 2024. "Conformism, social pressure, and the dynamics of integration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 279-304.
    4. Matteo Bizzarri & Fabrizio Panebianco & Paolo Pin, 2020. "Epidemic dynamics with homophily, vaccination choices, and pseudoscience attitudes," Papers 2007.08523, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
    5. Gong, Qingbin & Diao, Xundi, 2023. "The impacts of investor network and herd behavior on market stability: Social learning, network structure, and heterogeneity," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 306(3), pages 1388-1398.
    6. Sebastiano Della Lena & Fabrizio Panebianco, 2019. "Cultural Transmission with Incomplete Information: Parental Perceived Efficacy and Group Misrepresentation," Working Papers 2019:11, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    7. Hellmann, T. & Panebianco, F., 2018. "The transmission of continuous cultural traits in endogenous social networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 51-55.
    8. Hellmann, Tim & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2018. "The transmission of continuous cultural traits in endogenous social networks," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 579, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social networks; Diffusion; Cultural transmission; Homophily;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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