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Network effects and the appointment of female board members in Japan

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  • Matthias Raddant
  • Hiroshi Takahashi

Abstract

We investigate the dynamics in the networks of Japanese corporates and its interplay with the appointment of female board members. We find that firms with female board members show homophily with respect to gender and often have above average profitability. We also find that new appointments of women are more likely at boards which observe female board members at other firms to which they are tied by either ownership relations or corporate board interlocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Raddant & Hiroshi Takahashi, 2020. "Network effects and the appointment of female board members in Japan," Papers 2007.03980, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2007.03980
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bramoullé, Yann & Currarini, Sergio & Jackson, Matthew O. & Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W., 2012. "Homophily and long-run integration in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1754-1786.
    2. Mariateresa Torchia & Andrea Calabrò & Morten Huse, 2011. "Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to Critical Mass," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 299-317, August.
    3. Farrell, Kathleen A. & Hersch, Philip L., 2005. "Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 85-106, March.
    4. Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, 2012. "The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 137-197.
    5. Kolev, Gueorgui I., 2012. "Underperformance by female CEOs: A more powerful test," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 436-440.
    6. Scott E. Page, 2007. "Prologue to The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies, Princeton University Press.
    7. Raddant, Matthias & Takahashi, Hiroshi, 2020. "Corporate boards, interorganizational ties and profitability: The case of Japan," Economics Working Papers 2020-02, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    8. Kevin Campbell & Antonio Mínguez-Vera, 2008. "Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 435-451, December.
    9. Erik Devos & Andrew Prevost & John Puthenpurackal, 2009. "Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 861-887, December.
    10. Nai H. Lamb & Philip Roundy, 2016. "The ‘ties that bind’ board interlocks research: a systematic review," Management Research Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 39(11), pages 1516-1542, November.
    11. Joanne Horton & Yuval Millo & George Serafeim, 2012. "Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3-4), pages 399-426, April.
    12. McDowell, John M & Smith, Janet Kiholm, 1992. "The Effect of Gender-Sorting on Propensity to Coauthor: Implications for Academic Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(1), pages 68-82, January.
    13. Faccio, Mara & Marchica, Maria-Teresa & Mura, Roberto, 2016. "CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 193-209.
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