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Jun Zhang

Personal Details

First Name:Jun
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhang
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh182
http://zhangjun.weebly.com/index.html

Affiliation

Economics Discipline Group
Business School
University of Technology Sydney

Sydney, Australia
http://business.uts.edu.au/economics/

: +61 2 9514 7777
+61 2 9514 7722
PO Box 123, Broadway NSW 2007, Sydney
RePEc:edi:edutsau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ruqu Wang & Jun Zhang, 2010. "Common Value Auctions with Return Policies," Working Papers 1235, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
  2. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.
  3. Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Wikipedia mentions

(Only mentions on Wikipedia that link back to a page on a RePEc service)
  1. Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.

    Mentioned in:

    1. User:Kirkpcarlson/Elimination contest in Wikipedia (English)

Working papers

  1. Ruqu Wang & Jun Zhang, 2010. "Common Value Auctions with Return Policies," Working Papers 1235, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.

  2. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Metzger, Lars P., 2015. "Alliance Formation in Contests with Incomplete Information," Ruhr Economic Papers 544, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    3. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.

    Cited by:

    1. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-583, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2016. "Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 224-238.

  2. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.

    Cited by:

    1. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017. "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 58-90.
    2. Lang, Xu, 2016. "Essays in microeconomic theory," Other publications TiSEM 767e79ca-5c15-4a6e-86a5-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
    4. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    5. McAdams, David, 2015. "On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 959-972.

  3. Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.

    Cited by:

    1. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2014. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 10192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Masaki Aoyagi, 2003. "Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," ISER Discussion Paper 0580, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    6. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    7. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    8. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Lian Jian & Zheng Li & Tracy Xiao Liu, 2017. "Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 648-669, September.
    10. Tomer Ifergane & Aner Sela, 2017. "Signaling In Contests," Working Papers 1708, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    11. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2008-10-28
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2008-10-28

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