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Jun Zhang

Not to be confused with: Jun Zhang

Personal Details

First Name:Jun
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhang
Suffix:Sr.
RePEc Short-ID:pzh182
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://zhangjun.weebly.com/index.html

Affiliation

Economics Discipline Group
Business School
University of Technology Sydney

Sydney, Australia
http://business.uts.edu.au/economics/
RePEc:edi:edutsau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin & Jun Zhang, 2024. "Tournaments with a Standard," Papers 2412.01139, arXiv.org.
  2. C. Bram Cadsby & Ninghua Du & Ruqu Wang & Jun Zhang, 2015. "Goodwill Can Hurt: a Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Return Policies in Auctions," Working Papers 1501, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  3. Ruqu Wang & Jun Zhang, 2010. "Common Value Auctions With Return Policies," Working Paper 1235, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  4. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling In Elimination Contests," Working Paper 1184, Economics Department, Queen's University.

Articles

  1. Yanlin Chen & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Signalling by Bayesian Persuasion and Pricing Strategy," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(628), pages 976-1007.
  2. Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018. "Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 291-317.
  3. Jun Zhang & Junjie Zhou, 2016. "Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(597), pages 2197-2217, November.
  4. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.
  5. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
  6. Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. C. Bram Cadsby & Ninghua Du & Ruqu Wang & Jun Zhang, 2015. "Goodwill Can Hurt: a Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Return Policies in Auctions," Working Papers 1501, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.

    Cited by:

    1. Shi, Song & Zhang, Hong & Zhang, Jun, 2022. "The impact of a home purchase restrictions (HPR) policy on the distressed property market in Beijing," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).

  2. Ruqu Wang & Jun Zhang, 2010. "Common Value Auctions With Return Policies," Working Paper 1235, Economics Department, Queen's University.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.

  3. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling In Elimination Contests," Working Paper 1184, Economics Department, Queen's University.

    Cited by:

    1. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.
    4. Metzger, Lars P., 2015. "Alliance Formation in Contests with Incomplete Information," Ruhr Economic Papers 544, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    5. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

Articles

  1. Yanlin Chen & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Signalling by Bayesian Persuasion and Pricing Strategy," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(628), pages 976-1007.

    Cited by:

    1. Charlson, G., 2021. "Rating the Competition: Seller Ratings and Intra-Platform Competition," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2106, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
    3. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Informed Information Design," Working Papers halshs-03107866, HAL.
    4. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    5. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2023. "Signaling through tests," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 25-34.
    6. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Elliott, M. & Galeotti., A. & Koh., A. & Li, W., 2021. "Market Segmentation Through Information," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2105, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
    9. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2023. "Irrelevance of personalized pricing under strategic market segmentation," Papers 2303.13295, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.

  2. Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018. "Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 291-317.

    Cited by:

    1. Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2024. "Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    2. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    3. Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2020. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," Diskussionsschriften dp2011, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    4. Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020. "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    5. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2019. "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-161.
    8. Boyarchenko, Svetlana, 2021. "Inefficiency of sponsored research," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    9. Paul Pecorino, 2020. "Bridge burning and escape routes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 399-414, September.
    10. Mengxi Zhang, 2023. "Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_156v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    11. Feng, Xin & Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2024. "Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    12. Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2024. "Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests," Working Papers 2407, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    13. Xiao, Jun, 2023. "Ability grouping in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    14. Andrzej Baranski & Sumit Goel, 2024. "The effect of competition in contests: A unifying approach," Papers 2410.04970, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.

  3. Jun Zhang & Junjie Zhou, 2016. "Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(597), pages 2197-2217, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
    2. Chen, Bo & Chen, Bo, 2024. "Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 204-222.
    3. Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 61-64.
    4. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
    5. Zenou, Yves & Xu, Jin & Zhou, Junjie, 2019. "Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 13647, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020. "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    7. Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco & Wang, Zijia, 2024. "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    8. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
    9. Xu, Jin & Zenou, Yves & Zhou, Junjie, 2022. "Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    10. Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2020. "Advertising and Voter Data in Asymmetric Political Contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    11. Xin Feng, 2023. "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 401-421, June.
    12. Lu, Jingfeng & Ma, Hongkun & Wang, Zhewei, 2023. "Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    13. Dino Gerardi & Edoardo Grillo & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," Working Papers 122, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    14. Raphaela Hennigs, 2019. "Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-16_1, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    15. Juan Beccuti & Marc M ller, 2020. "Fighting for Lemons: The Encouragement Effect in Dynamic Contests with Private Information," Diskussionsschriften dp2017, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    16. Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018. "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers pme809, Job Market Papers.
    17. Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, 2024. "Diversification and information in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(1), pages 263-294, August.
    18. Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    19. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    20. Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017. "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 36-40.
    21. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2021. "Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    22. Chen, Bo, 2020. "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    23. Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana (D.) Sisak, 2018. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    24. Kuang, Zhonghong & Zhao, Hangcheng & Zheng, Jie, 2024. "Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 218-243.
    25. Oleg Muratov, 2025. "Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 513-543, September.
    26. Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021. "Partial information disclosure in a contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    27. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    28. Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences," Discussion Papers 2023-07, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    29. Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023. "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 141-160.
    30. Dasgupta, Sulagna, 2024. "Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 5-16.
    31. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    32. Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
    33. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
    34. Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020. "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    35. Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021. "Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 178-198.
    36. Szydlowski, Martin, 2024. "Fomenting conflict," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    37. Marco Serena, 2022. "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 763-792, October.
    38. Nikandrova, Arina & Pancs, Romans, 2017. "Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 174-212.
    39. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    40. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    41. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    42. Raphael Boleslavsky & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2023. "Signaling With Commitment," Papers 2305.00777, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
    43. Feng, Xin, 2024. "Ambiguous persuasion in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 182-201.
    44. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.
    45. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

  4. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.

    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Xiaoshu, 2025. "Optimal auctions with sequential arrival: Allowing for re-auction and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    2. Xiaoyong Cao & Yunxia Yang & Siru Li, 2023. "Resale in second‐price auctions with private entry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(6), pages 3269-3276, September.
    3. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2023. "Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    4. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
    5. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    6. McAdams, David, 2015. "On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 959-972.
    7. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017. "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 58-90.
    8. Weiye Cheny, 2018. "Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale: An Ex-Ante Price Default Model," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-24, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    9. Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2629-2661, November.
    10. Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2023. "Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1207-1245, May.
    11. Lang, Xu, 2016. "Essays in microeconomic theory," Other publications TiSEM 767e79ca-5c15-4a6e-86a5-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.

  5. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.

    Cited by:

    1. Toomas Hinnosaar & Keiichi Kawai, 2018. "Robust Pricing with Refunds," Papers 1808.02233, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
    2. Xiaomin Zhao & Shuhui Hu & Xiaoxiao Meng, 2020. "Who should pay for return freight in the online retailing? Retailers or consumers," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 427-452, June.
    3. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2016. "Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 224-238.

  6. Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo.
    3. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
    5. Masaki Aoyagi, 2003. "Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," ISER Discussion Paper 0580, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    6. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    7. Kräkel, Matthias, 2011. "Sandbagging," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2011, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    8. Brendan Daley & Ruoyu Wang, 2018. "When to Release Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 11-26, March.
    9. Bo Chen & Shanlin Jin, 2023. "Elimination contests with collusive team players," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 61-89, February.
    10. Nicolas de Roos & Alexander Matros & Vladimir Smirnov, 2024. "Elimination tournaments with resource constraints," Working Papers 2024-06, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    11. Migheli, Matteo, 2019. "Competing for promotion: Are “THE BEST” always the best?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 149-161.
    12. Schmutzler, Armin & Klein, Arnd, 2015. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112882, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Lian Jian & Zheng Li & Tracy Xiao Liu, 2017. "Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 648-669, September.
    14. Tomer Ifergane & Aner Sela, 2017. "Signaling In Contests," Working Papers 1708, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    15. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    16. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
    17. Jean-François Mercier, 2018. "Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 927-947, September.
    18. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling In Elimination Contests," Working Paper 1184, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    19. Bo Chen & Bo Chen & Dmitriy Knyazev, 2022. "Information disclosure in dynamic research contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 113-137, March.
    20. Damien Besancenot & Samira Guennif, 2024. "Compulsory license threats in a signaling game of drug procurement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 261-298, September.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2008-10-28
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2025-01-27
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2015-03-22
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2008-10-28
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2025-01-27
  6. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (1) 2025-01-27

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