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The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests

Author

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  • Jun Zhang
  • Ruqu Wang

Abstract

In this article, we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that no symmetric separating equilibrium exists under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. We then characterise a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. We finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximising the total efforts from the contestants. Within our framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Jun Zhang & Ruqu Wang, 2009. "The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 613-641, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:536:p:613-641
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo.
    2. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    3. Migheli, Matteo, 2019. "Competing for promotion: Are “THE BEST” always the best?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 149-161.
    4. Jean-François Mercier, 2018. "Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 927-947, September.
    5. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017. "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 199-224.
    6. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2010. "Information feedback in a dynamic tournament," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 242-260, November.
    7. Matthias Kräkel, 2014. "Sandbagging," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(3), pages 263-284, June.
    8. Bo Chen & Bo Chen & Dmitriy Knyazev, 2022. "Information disclosure in dynamic research contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 113-137, March.
    9. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    10. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
    11. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    12. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling In Elimination Contests," Working Paper 1184, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    13. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Brendan Daley & Ruoyu Wang, 2018. "When to Release Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 11-26, March.
    15. Bo Chen & Shanlin Jin, 2023. "Elimination contests with collusive team players," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 61-89, February.
    16. Lian Jian & Zheng Li & Tracy Xiao Liu, 2017. "Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 648-669, September.
    17. Sela, Aner, 2017. "Signaling in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 11798, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.

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