The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests
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- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo Group Munich.
- Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Said, Maher, 2012.
"Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization,"
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Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
- Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017.
"Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 199-224.
- Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2014. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 10192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmutzler, Armin & Klein, Arnd, 2015. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112882, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Arnd Heinrich Klein & Armin Schmutzler, 2014. "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," ECON - Working Papers 175, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2010. "Information feedback in a dynamic tournament," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 242-260, November.
- Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-016-9504-1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Tomer Ifergane & Aner Sela, 2017. "Signaling In Contests," Working Papers 1708, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
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