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Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction

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  • Oleg Muratov

    (University of Bern)

Abstract

I formally establish the existence of a mapping between a class of information design games with multiple senders and a class of all-pay auctions. I fully characterize this mapping and show how to use it to find equilibria in the information design game. The mapping allows for a straightforward comparative statics analysis of equilibria in the latter class of games. I use it to study the effect of the tie-breaking rule on the distributions of posteriors and the receiver’s payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Oleg Muratov, 2025. "Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 513-543, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-023-00334-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00334-w
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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