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Patterns of corporate governance and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing

  • Sergio Destefanis

    (CELPE and CSEF, University of Salerno, Italy)

  • Vania Sena

    (Aston Business School, Aston University, UK)

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the corporate governance system and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing. We use a non-parametric frontier technique (DEA) to derive technical efficiency measures for a sample of Italian firms taken from nine manufacturing industries. These measures are then related to the characteristics of the corporate governance system. Two of these characteristics turn out to have a positive impact on technical efficiency: the percentage of the company shares owned by the largest shareholder and the fact that a firm belongs to a pyramidal group. Interestingly, a trade-off emerges between these influences, in the sense that one is stronger in industries where the other is weaker. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1310
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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-40

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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:27-40
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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