IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_164_3_7353.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?

Author

Listed:
  • Nathalie Greenan
  • Marc-Arthur Diaye
  • Patricia Crifo

Abstract

[fre] Cet article propose une théorie des entretiens d ’ évaluation alternative à celle d ’ une mesure ex post de la performance lorsque l ’ autonomie se développe , les salaires restant peu flexibles . Notre modèle d ’ agence avec travail en équipe met en évidence que de fortes interdépendances horizontales et une technologie super-modulaire ne garantissent pas la coordination vers l ’ équilibre Pareto-optimal . Le coût des incitations monétaires à la coordination étant croissant avec ces caractéristiques , le principal a intérêt à développer un système moins onéreux , les entretiens d ’ évaluation , ceux-ci générant ex ante un signal pour convaincre les travailleurs de l ’ existence d ’ un esprit d ’ équipe . Les prédictions de ce modèle sont testées empiriquement à partir des données de l ’ enquête Changement Organisationnel et Informatisation de 1997 . Les entretiens d ’ évaluation semblent être déterminés plus par la nature collective du travail que par le degré d ’ autonomie et ne s ’ accompagnent pas d ’ un gain monétaire mais d ’ un système de croyances sur le travail . Mots-clés : travail en équipe , aléa moral , coopération , incitations monétaires et non monétaires , entretien annuel [eng] This paper puts forward an alternative evaluation interview theory to the one of an ex post performance measurement when autonomy increases , since wages remain fairly rigid . Our agency model with teamwork shows that strong horizontal interdependence and super-modularity do not ensure coordination to reach Pareto-optimal equilibrium . The cost of monetary incentives for coordination increases as a function of these characteristics , which means that it is in the principal ’ s interest to develop a less costly system , such as individual evaluation interviews , since they generate an ex ante signal to convince workers of the existence of a team spirit . The model predictions were tested empirically using the data from the 1997 Computerisation and Organisational Change Survey . Individual evaluation interviews seem to be determined more by the degree of teamwork than by the degree of autonomy and they are not associated with monetary gains , but rather a belief system relating to work

Suggested Citation

  • Nathalie Greenan & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Patricia Crifo, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_164_3_7353
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2004.7353
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.2004.7353
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_164_3_7353
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, March.
    2. Michael Kremer, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-575.
    3. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-1364, November.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Brent Boning & Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 613-650.
    6. Martin Conyon & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance U.K. Evidence," NBER Chapters,in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000, pages 109-146 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June.
    8. Bhaskar Dutta & Salvador BarberÁ, 2000. "original papers : Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(2), pages 111-127.
    9. Sylvie Le Minez & Sébastien Roux, 2002. "Les différences de carrières salariales à partir du premier emploi," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 351(1), pages 31-63.
    10. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-580, June.
    11. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    12. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    13. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
    14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    15. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-528, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nathalie Greenan & Emmanuelle Walkowiak, 2005. "Informatique, organisation du travail et interactions sociales," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 387(1), pages 35-63.
    2. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan & Michal Urdanivia, 2007. "Subjective Evaluation of Performance Through Individual Evaluation Interview: Empirical evidence from France," NBER Working Papers 12979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Martine Gadille & François Jaujard, 2011. "L'hybridation des modèles d'évaluation de la performance : implications organisationnelles et individuelles," Post-Print emse-00658004, HAL.
    4. Crifo, Patricia, 2003. "La modélisation du changement organisationnel : déterminants et conséquences sur le marché du travail," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(3), pages 349-365, Septembre.
    5. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan & Michal W. Urdanivia, 2008. "Subjective Evaluation of Performance and Evaluation Interview: Empirical Evidence from France," NBER Chapters,in: The Analysis of Firms and Employees: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, pages 107-131 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_164_3_7353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.