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Evolutionary Game Theory and Economics. Part 2. Stability of Equilibria. Special Features of Human Behavior Evolution

  • Vasin, A.

    (The Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

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    The paper discusses convergence of evolutionary dynamics to mixed equiliria including different behavior strategies. Models of cooperative and altruistic behavior spreading are considered. The paper reveals special features of human behavior evolution in comparison with behavior in biological populations.

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    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2010-5-10-27r.pdf
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    Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

    Volume (Year): (2010)
    Issue (Month): 5 ()
    Pages: 10-27

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    Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:5:p:10-27
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    1. Ok, Efe A. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2001. "On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 231-254, April.
    2. Alexander Matros & John Duffy & Ted Temzelides, 2006. "Competitive Behavior in Market Games: Evidence and Theory," Working Papers 201, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 783, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Symmetric Games," Working papers 90-24, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    6. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
    7. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? : A Darwinian model of economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, August.
    8. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    9. E. Dekel & S. Scotchmer, 2010. "On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 434, David K. Levine.
    10. Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
    11. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    12. Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef, 1995. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 279-303, November.
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