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Modeling society with a responsible elite

Author

Listed:
  • Tsodikova, Ya.

    (V. A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)

  • Chebotarev, P.

    (The Technion, Israel)

Abstract

Within the framework of the ViSE (Voting in a Stochastic Environment) model, we examine the dynamics in a society, part of which can be considered an elite. The model allows us to analyze the influence of social attitudes, such as collectivism, individualism, altruism on the well-being of agents. The dynamics is determined by collective decisions and changes in the structure of society, in particular, by the formation of groups of cooperating agents. It is found that the presence of a "responsible elite", combining the support of other agents with limited concern for their own benefit, stabilizes society and eliminates the "pit of losses" paradox. The benefit to society from having a responsible elite is comparable to that from having a prosocial group of the same size. If the elite radically increases the weight of the group component in its combined voting strategy, then its incomes rise sharply, while society's incomes decline. If, in response to the selfish transformation of the elite, a new responsible elite emerges, proportionally larger than the previous one, then society will stabilize again, and the old elite will lose its dominant position. This process can be repeated as long as the size of society allows the formation of new responsible elites of the required size.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsodikova, Ya. & Chebotarev, P., 2025. "Modeling society with a responsible elite," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 12-35.
  • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2025:i:66:p:12-35
    DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2025_1_12-35
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; stochastic environment; ViSE model; responsible elite; prosociality; cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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