Regulation and self-regulation in banking: in search of optimum
The paper explores the nature of regulation in the banking sector and considers the following regulatory continuum: from free banking through self-regulation to supervisory regulation. Because the state’s responsibility for the functioning of the financial system requires the state to enact laws forming the system’s legal framework, laissez-faireism in banking is not possible. Nevertheless, the modern regulatory dialectics – liberalisation and deregulation alternating with re-regulation – brings up the issue of possible advantages and disadvantages (benefits and costs) of the two approaches for the economy. Overregulation is costly, but lenient regulations may undermine economic stability. This means that a subtle balance between under-regulation and overregulation in the banking sector should be sought. There is a need for well-balanced proportions of legal standards and voluntary, negotiated rules. As perfect regulations do not exist, an effective and generally accepted legal framework must be created for the banking system, strengthened by the imperatives of ethics.
Volume (Year): 44 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 00-919 Warszawa ul. Świętokrzyska 11/21|
Phone: (0-22) 653 10 00
Fax: (0-22) 620 85 18
Web page: http://www.bankikredyt.nbp.pl/menu_en.aspx
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Goergens, Tue & Paldam, Martin & Würtz, Allan, . "How does Public Regulation affect Growth?," Economics Working Papers 2003-14, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Bruno, Valentina & Claessens, Stijn, 2010.
"Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 461-482, October.
- Bruno, Valentina G. & Claessens, Stijn, 2007. "Corporate governance and regulation : can there be too much of a good thing ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4140, The World Bank.
- Valentina G. Bruno & Stijn Claessens, 2006. "Corporate governance and regulation: can there be too much of a good thing?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24633, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bruno, Valentina & Claessens, Stijn, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Amit Sachdeva, 2010. "Regulatory competition in European company law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 137-170, October.
- Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2012. "Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262017393, March.
- Cukierman, Alex, 2011.
"Reflections on the crisis and on its lessons for regulatory reform and for central bank policies,"
Journal of Financial Stability,
Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 26-37, January.
- Alex Cukierman, 2011. "Reflections on the Crisis and on its Lessons for Regulatory Reforms and for Central Bank Policies," Chapters, in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2008.
"Rethinking Bank Regulation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521709309, December.
- Martin Cihak & Alexander F. Tieman, 2008. "Quality of Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision Around the World," IMF Working Papers 08/190, International Monetary Fund.
- Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May.
- de Jong, Abe & DeJong, Douglas V. & Mertens, Gerard & Wasley, Charles E., 2005. "The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: evidence and implications from The Netherlands," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 473-503, June.
- Enrica Detragiache & Asli DemirgÃ¼Ã§-Kunt, 1998.
"Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility,"
IMF Working Papers
98/83, International Monetary Fund.
- George Gelauff & Arjan Lejour, 2006. "Five Lisbon highlights; the economic impact of reaching these targets," CPB Document 104, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
- Charles Goodhart, 2008. "The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis," FMG Special Papers sp177, Financial Markets Group.
- Alnoor Bhimani, 2008. "Making corporate governance count: the fusion of ethics and economic rationality," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(2), pages 135-147, May.
- Udaibir S Das & Marc G Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management; The Role of Regulatory Governance," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund.
- Alain de Serres & Shuji Kobayakawa & Torsten Sløk & Laura Vartia, 2006. "Regulation of Financial Systems and Economic Growth," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 506, OECD Publishing.
- Berger, Allen N. & Herring, Richard J. & Szego, Giorgio P., 1995.
"The role of capital in financial institutions,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 393-430, June.
- Allen N. Berger & Richard J. Herring & Giorgio P. Szego, 1995. "The role of capital in financial institutions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-23, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Allen N. Berger & Richard J. Herring & Giorgio P. Szegö, 1995. "The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Beck, Thorsten, 2010. "Regulatory Reform After the Crisis: Opportunities and Pitfalls," CEPR Discussion Papers 7733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001.
"Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2725, The World Bank.
- Lazzarini, Sergio G. & Carvalho de Mello, Pedro, 2001. "Governmental versus self-regulation of derivative markets: examining the U.S. and Brazilian experience," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 185-207.
- Moshirian, Fariborz, 2011. "The global financial crisis and the evolution of markets, institutions and regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 502-511, March.
- Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2008.
"Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking,"
NBER Working Papers
14113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpbik:v:44:y:2013:i:2:p:119-158. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sylwia Roszkowska)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.