Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations
This paper studies a theoretical model aimed at assessing the optimal access charges and retail prices in the postal sector. It takes explicitly into account three main characteristics of the postal sector: the ability of entrants to bypass the incumbent’s delivery network; the imposition on the incumbent, but not on entrants of universal service obligations; and the provision of access to both competitors and customers. The paper first develops analytical formulations of the optimal access charges and the incumbent’s end-to-end retail price. It then presents calibrated results illustrating the impact on prices and welfare of various scenarios. Copyright Springer 2006
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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- Joan Calzada, 2006.
"Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 69-102, January.
- Joan Calzada Aymerich, 2004. "Worksharing and access discounts in the postal sector with asymmetrics information," Working Papers in Economics 112, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)