IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2008_29.html

Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Hellwig

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Abstract

The paper discusses the respective roles of competition policy and sector-specific regulation for industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and gas, in which network infrastructures that are natural monopolies serve as essential facilities for anybody who wants to provide services in downstream markets. Whereas, in the past, such industries tended to be organized as state-owned or state-regulated vertically integrated monopolies, after a fundamental change of paradigm, appropriate governance nowadays is considered to involve downstream competition supported by a state-mandated access provision to the monopoly infrastructures. Following a brief sketch of the paradigm change, the paper enters into a systematic discussion of (i) the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the two policy regimes in enforcing access provision, (ii) the appropriate framework for drawing the line between regulated and unregulated parts of the industry, and (iii) a set of issues that arise when competition policy and to sector-specific regulation apply to a given industry at the same time. The discussion refers to (i) the German experience before 2005 when competition policy was used to regulate access in the energy sector, (ii) the European Directives of 2002, which rely on the concepts of “market” and “significant market power” to determine which parts of the industry should be subject to regulation, and (iii) the recent cases in the telecommunications and postal sectors in which European competition law was used to proscribe behaviour that had been accepted by national regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hellwig, 2008. "Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2008_29, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_29
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2008_29online.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Newbery, 2006. "The Relationship Between Regulation and Competition Policy for Network Utilities," Working Papers EPRG 0611, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    2. Felix Höffler, 2006. "Monopoly Prices versus Ramsey-Boiteux Prices: Are they “Similar”, and: Does it Matter?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 27-43, March.
    3. David M. Newbery, 2002. "Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262640481, December.
    4. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    5. Höffler, Felix & Kranz, Sebastian, 2007. "Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 15/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    6. Newbery, David M., 2002. "Problems of liberalising the electricity industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 919-927, May.
    7. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michał Grajek & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2012. "Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 189-216.
    2. Klaus Friesenbichler, 2019. "What Explains Aggregate Telecom Investments? Evidence From an EU-OECD Panel," WIFO Working Papers 583, WIFO.
    3. Duso, Tomaso & Seldeslachts, Jo & Szucs, Florian, 2019. "The Impact of Competition Policy Enforcement on the Functioning of EU Energy Markets," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 40(01), pages 97-120.
    4. Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 1-9.
    5. Valentiny, Pál & Kiss, Károly Miklós, 2009. "A nélkülözhetetlen eszközök értelmezése és a postai szolgáltatások [The interpretation of essential facilities and the postal services]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1001-1024.
    6. I. Vogelsang, 2015. "Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(2), pages 117-155, June.
    7. Amelia Fletcher, 2023. "International pro-competition regulation of digital platforms: healthy experimentation or dangerous fragmentation?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 39(1), pages 12-33.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jamasb, T. & Mota, R. & Newbery, D. & Pollitt, M., 2004. "‘Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Performance’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0439, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives," UCLA Economics Online Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020. "Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    4. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
    5. Major, Iván & Kiss, Károly M., 2011. "Regulation of network industries in the European Union and in Central and Eastern Europe," 22nd European Regional ITS Conference, Budapest 2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues 52194, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    6. Alessandro Avenali & Giorgio Matteucci & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2010. "How does vertical industry structure affect investment in infrastructure quality?," DIS Technical Reports 2010-08, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    7. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    8. Francesca Stroffolini, 2008. "Access Price Cap Mechanisms and Industry Structure with Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 193, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    9. E. Villemeur & Helmuth Cremer & Bernard Roy & Joëlle Toledano, 2007. "Worksharing, access and bypass: the structure of prices in the postal sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 67-85, August.
    10. Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis‐Christou & Arthur Schram, 2008. "Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 192-214, January.
    11. Lise, Wietze & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Hers, Sebastiaan, 2008. "Market power in the European electricity market--The impacts of dry weather and additional transmission capacity," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1331-1343, April.
    12. Felix Höffler, 2009. "Mobile termination and collusion, revisited," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 246-274, June.
    13. John FitzGerald, 2002. "The Irish Energy Market - Putting the Customer First," Papers WP145, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    14. Karsten Neuhoff, 2002. "Optimal congestion treatment for bilateral electricity trading," Working Papers EP05, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    15. Hagen Worch & Bernhard Truffer & Mundia Kabinga & Jochen Markard & Anton Eberhard, 2012. "Tackling the Capability Gap in Utility Firms: Applying Management Research to Infrastructure Sectors," CID Working Papers 55, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    16. Sjaak Hurkens & Ángel Luis López, 2010. "Mobile Termination and Consumer Expectations under the Receiver-Pays Regime," Working Papers 10-12, NET Institute.
    17. Ling, Shuai & Jia, Ning & Ma, Shoufeng & Lan, Yanfei & Hu, Wandi, 2019. "An incentive mechanism design for bus subsidy based on the route service level," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 271-283.
    18. repec:aen:eeepjl:3-1-a05 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Marcel Canoy & Paul de Bijl & Ron Kemp, 2004. "Access to telecommunications networks," Chapters, in: Pierre A. Buigues & Patrick Rey (ed.), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2018. "Conventional Power Plants in Liberalized Electricity Marketswith Renewable Entry," The Energy Journal, , vol. 39(3), pages 69-92, May.
    21. Jamasb, T. & Söderberg, M., 2009. "Yardstick and Ex-post Regulation by Norm Model: Empirical Equivalence, Pricing Effect, and Performance in Sweeden," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0908, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marc Martin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.