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Comparative Statics Of A Monopolistic Firm Facing Rate-Of-Return And Command-And-Control Pollution Constraints

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  • Michael R. Caputo
  • Dmitriy Popov

Abstract

type="main"> The intrinsic comparative statics properties of a general rate-of-return regulated, profit-maximizing model of a monopolist facing a command-and-control pollution constraint are derived. Recent advances in the theory of comparative statics are used to derive the basic comparative statics of the model, which are contained in an observable negative semi-definite matrix and possess the form of Slutsky-like expressions. We consider several command-and-control pollution constraints that are commonly implemented in practice, and conclude that the intrinsic comparative statics properties of the model are qualitatively invariant to the type of command-and-control pollution constraint imposed. We compare our results with those extant, and find that several basic results from the standard A–J model no longer hold in our model.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael R. Caputo & Dmitriy Popov, 2014. "Comparative Statics Of A Monopolistic Firm Facing Rate-Of-Return And Command-And-Control Pollution Constraints," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(S1), pages 17-35, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:66:y:2014:i:s1:p:s17-s35
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David P. Baron, 1985. "Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 553-568, Winter.
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    7. Helfand, Gloria E, 1991. "Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 622-634, June.
    8. Michael R. Caputo & M. Hossein Partovi, 2008. "Intrinsic comparative statics of a general class of profit-maximizing rate-of-return regulated firms," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 369-382, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Anhua & Xin, Ling & Li, Jun, 2022. "Assessing the impact of the carbon market on the improvement of China's energy and carbon emission performance," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 258(C).
    2. Caputo, Michael R., 2014. "Comparative statics of a monopolistic firm facing price-cap and command-and-control environmental regulations," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 464-471.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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