Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector
Postal markets are open to competitor for a long time. But, with a few exceptions, the competitors of the incumbent postal operator are currently active on the upstream segments of the market -preparation,collection, outward sorting and transport of mail products. With the further steps planed in the liberalization process, there are new opportunities to extend competition to the downstream segments of the market -the delivery of mails. In the future, two business model will be possible for the new postal operators: (1) access: where the firm perform the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's deliverynetwork and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own delivery network. These two options have a different impact on both the welfare and the profitof the historical operator. In particular, bypass raises severe concerns for the financing of the universal service obligations.The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the cost of buying access to the incumbent operator (the access price). In this paper, we derive optimal -welfare maximizing- stamp and access prices for the incumbent operator when these prices have an impact on the delivery method chosen by the entrant. We show how prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous i.e. affected by the incumbent'sprices.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00411358|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Philippe Donder, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(3), pages 307-326, 05.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994.
"Access pricing and competition,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
- J-J. Laffont & J. Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 95-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector," IDEI Working Papers 319, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- DAM, Kaniska & GAUTIER, Axel & MITRA, Manipushpak, 2007. "Efficient access pricing and endogenous market structure," CORE Discussion Papers 2007004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kaniska Dam & Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2007. "Efficient Access Pricing and Endogenous Market Structure," Working papers DTE 384, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Kanishka Dam & Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2008. "Efficient Access Pricing and Endogenous Market Structure," CREPP Working Papers 0802, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
- Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2008. "Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(300), pages 662-682, November.
- GAUTIER, Axel & MITRA, Manipushpak, "undated". "Regulation of an open access essential facility," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2003. "Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse19_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
- GAUTIER, Axel & MITRA, Manipushpak, 2003. "Regulation of an open access essential facility," CORE Discussion Papers 2003084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mark Armstrong, 2001. "Access Pricing, Bypass, and Universal Service," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 297-301, May.
- Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
- Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C. & Vickers, J., 1995. "The access pricing problem: a synthesis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9532, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.