Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market
We build a model where a postal incumbent offering single piece, transactional and advertising mail competes with postal entrants and with a firm offering an alternative medium. We solve for the optimal prices under various competition assumptions. We calibrate the model and provide numerical simulations in order to shed light on the impact of these assumptions on volumes and welfare levels.
|Date of creation:||02 Apr 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in The Review of Network Economics, vol.�10, n°3, 2011.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23|
Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/
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- Armstrong Mark, 2008.
"Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post,"
Review of Network Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-16, June.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post," MPRA Paper 62, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Donder, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 307-326, 05.
- De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector," IDEI Working Papers 319, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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