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Termination Charges in the International Parcel Market

  • Andreas Haller
  • Christian Jaag
  • Urs Trinkner

This paper explains the potentially excessive termination charges and low quality levels in the international parcel market with a stylized game theoretic model. Within this model it is possible to elaborate the distortions currently in place. The model incorporates quality to account for empirical findings on consumer preferences which indicate that quality of service is a crucial issue in the international parcel market.

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Paper provided by Swiss Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0033.

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Date of creation: Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:chc:wpaper:0033
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  1. Yongmin Chen & David E. M. Sappington, 2010. "INNOVATION IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 373-401, 06.
  2. Andreas Haller & Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2011. "Termination Charges in the International Parcel Market: Competition and Regulation," Working Papers 0028, Swiss Economics.
  3. Benz, Men-Andri & Bühler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2003. "Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Gans, Joshua S & Williams, Philip L, 1999. "Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(229), pages 127-37, June.
  6. Stefan Buehler & Dennis Gärtner & Daniel Halbheer, 2006. "Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 99-115, 07.
  7. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
  8. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2008. "Pricing in Competitive Two-Sided Mail Markets," Chapters, in: Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector, chapter 10 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  9. Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2008. "Intimidating competitors -- Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 247-265, January.
  10. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
  11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring.
  12. Helmut M. Dietl & Urs Trinkner & Reto Bleisch, 2004. "Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss Letter Market," Working Papers 0001, Swiss Economics, revised Jul 2005.
  13. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, December.
  14. Urs Trinkner & Christian Jaag & Helmut Dietl & Haller Andreas & Verbeek Erwin & Fürst Oliver, 2011. "International Parcels – Review of Inward Land Rates," Studies and Reports, Swiss Economics, pages 1-72, August.
  15. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Intimidating Competitors � Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive Oligopoly," SOI - Working Papers 0409, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2005.
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