Termination Charges in the International Parcel Market
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- Andreas Haller & Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2013. "Termination charges in the international parcel market," Chapters,in: Reforming the Postal Sector in the Face of Electronic Competition, chapter 19, pages 277-293 Edward Elgar Publishing.
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- Kokoreva, Maria S. & Stepanova, Anastasia N. & Karnoukhova, Elena V., 2016. "What We Do not Know about the Ownership Structure of the Largest U.S. Companies?," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 36-59, December.
More about this item
KeywordsInternational parcel market; Termination charges; Remuneration system;
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L87 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Postal and Delivery Services
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