IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v26y2008i1p247-265.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intimidating competitors -- Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Buehler, Stefan
  • Schmutzler, Armin

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2008. "Intimidating competitors -- Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 247-265, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:1:p:247-265
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-7187(06)00152-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 565-602, May.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1994. "The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in oligopolistic industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 133-150, February.
    3. Ivan Dufeu, 2004. "Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies," Post-Print hal-00581571, HAL.
    4. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
    5. Dufeu Ivan, 2004. "Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-18, April.
    6. Tasneem Chipty, 2001. "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 428-453, June.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    8. Chen, Yongmin, 2001. "On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 667-685, Winter.
    9. Walter Elberfeld, 2002. "Market size and vertical integration: Stigler’s hypothesis reconsidered," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 23-42, March.
    10. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    11. Jansen, Jos, 2003. "Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 699-716, May.
    12. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    13. Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1994. "The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1115-1140, September.
    14. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    15. Ivan Dufeu, 2004. "Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies," Working Papers hal-00581571, HAL.
    16. Banerjee, Samiran & Lin, Ping, 2003. "Downstream R&D, raising rivals' costs, and input price contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 79-96, January.
    17. Brocas, Isabelle, 2003. "Vertical integration and incentives to innovate," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 457-488, April.
    18. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Downstream Investment in Oligopoly," SOI - Working Papers 0310, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    19. Walter Elberfeld, 2001. "Explaining Intraindustry Differences in the Extent of Vertical Integration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 465-477, September.
    20. Laurent Linnemer, 2003. "Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 231-259, June.
    21. Abiru, Masahiro & Nahata, Babu & Raychaudhuri, Subhashis & Waterson, Michael, 1998. "Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 463-480, December.
    22. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
    23. Athey, Susan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2001. "Investment and Market Dominance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    24. Ivan Dufeu, 2004. "Market size and vertical equilibrium in the context of successive Cournot oligopolies," Post-Print halshs-00068322, HAL.
    25. Flaherty, M Therese, 1980. "Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1187-1209, July.
    26. Reiffen, David, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 694-697, June.
    27. Beggs, Alan W & Klemperer, Paul, 1992. "Multi-period Competition with Switching Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 651-666, May.
    28. Buehler Stefan & Schmutzler Armin, 2005. "Asymmetric Vertical Integration," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, January.
    29. Alexander Schrader & Stephen Martin, 1998. "Vertical Market Participation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(3), pages 321-331, June.
    30. Ivan Dufeu, 2004. "Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies [Taille du marché et équilibre vertical dans un contexte d'oligopoles successifs de Cournot]," Post-Print hal-02816481, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matsushima Noriaki & Mizuno Tomomichi, 2012. "Equilibrium Vertical Integration with Complementary Input Markets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, June.
    2. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Intimidating Competitors � Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive Oligopoly," SOI - Working Papers 0409, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2005.
    3. Noriaki Matsushima & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2007. "Why do large firms tend to integrate vertically? - asymmetric vertical integration reconsidered -," Discussion Papers 2007-34, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    4. Zanaj Skerdilajda, 2010. "Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, November.
    5. Zanaj Skerdilajda, 2010. "Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, November.
    6. Roberto Hernán González & Praveen Kujal, 2012. "Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, April.
    7. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Downstream Investment in Oligopoly," SOI - Working Papers 0310, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    8. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2008. "Vertical foreclosure: a policy framework," CPB Document 157, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    9. Johan Hombert & Jérôme Pouyet & Nicolas Schutz, 2019. "Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3-4), pages 484-514, September.
    10. Schmutzler, Armin & Bühler, Stefan, 2003. "Who Integrates?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    12. Ahmad Reza Saboori Memar & Georg Götz, 2013. "R&D Incentives in Vertically Related Markets," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201307, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    13. Kensuke Kubo, 2011. "Explaining vertical integration in the generic pharmaceutical industry," Discussion Papers 11-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    14. Lin, Ping, 2006. "Strategic spin-offs of input divisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 977-993, May.
    15. Zanchettin, Piercarlo & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2017. "Vertical integration and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 25-57.
    16. Inderst, Roman & Valletti, Tommaso, 2011. "Incentives for input foreclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 820-831, August.
    17. Choi, Jay Pil & Yi, Sang-Seung, 2016. "An equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 659-676.
    18. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," SOI - Working Papers 0212, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    19. Upender Subramanian & Jagmohan S. Raju & Z. John Zhang, 2013. "Exclusive Handset Arrangements in the Wireless Industry: A Competitive Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 246-270, March.
    20. Baake, Pio & Kamecke, Ulrich & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2004. "Vertical foreclosure versus downstream competition with capital precommitment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 185-192, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:1:p:247-265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.