Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies

There are two well-established empirical regularities about voters. First, they entertain systematically biased beliefs about how public policies affect economic outcomes. Second, voters vote retrospectively: they punish the incumbent for poor and reward him for good macroeconomic performance. Thus, political parties face a trade-off: offering popular yet economically harmful policies increases the chance of being elected today, but decreases the chance of re-election. We provide the first rigorous game-theoretical analysis of the trade-off. The model addresses two questions: How can biased beliefs and retrospective voting be explained consistently? What policy outcomes emerge in party competition? To micro-found persistently biased beliefs we introduce the psychological concept of mental models. Deviating from earlier studies, we allow parties to choose strategic mixtures of populist (i.e., bad yet popular) and good (but less popular) platforms. We show that retrospective voting provides a self-correction mechanism, so that parties offer strategic mixtures of policies in equilibrium rather than purely populist or purely good policy platforms. Thus, democracy is characterized by mediocre policy choices and half-hearted reforms. An incumbent bias or unclear responsibilities weaken the self-correction mechanism. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013