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Natural Budget Deficit and Natural Political Cyclicality

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  • Khani Hoolari, Seyed Morteza
  • Taghinejad Omran, Vahid

Abstract

In this paper we present a framework showing how governments use debt to flaunt competency and increase their votes and the chances of reelection; however, a cognitive bias, namely, the cyclist bias, would disrupt government’s computations. In this model the government’s budget deficit as well as changes in debt would be evaluated in a steady state. We show that debt is a double-edged sword and the more the government relies on debt to show its competency, the more the people understand the manipulations at work behind such measures. On equilibrium, due to cognitive bias in the behavior of individuals, the government will choose budget deficit which it is increasing, leading to the fall of the current incumbent and ultimately the opposition party would take over the power. The model can provide theoretical foundations for what the empirical study of Brender & Drazen (2008) concludes: expansive fiscal policies before elections won't increase reelection probability.

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  • Khani Hoolari, Seyed Morteza & Taghinejad Omran, Vahid, 2017. "Natural Budget Deficit and Natural Political Cyclicality," MPRA Paper 78107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:78107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lenka Maličká, 2019. "Political Expenditure Cycle at the Municipal Government Level in Slovakia," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 503-513.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural budget deficit; Natural political cyclicality; Cyclist bias;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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