IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-01845067.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How much does environment pay for politicians?

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Boly

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Louis Combes

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Pascale Combes Motel

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We empirically explore how elections impact climate change policy and environmental degradation, using a sample of 76 democratic countries over the period 1990‐2014. Three key results emerge from our system‐GMM estimations. First, election years are characterized by an increase in C02 emissions, even though the effect weakens over the recent years. Second, this effect is present only in established democracies, where incumbents engage in fiscal manipulation through the composition of public spending rather than its level. Third, higher freedom of the press and high environmental preferences from citizens reduce the size of this trade‐off between pork barrel spending and the public good, namely environment quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Boly & Jean-Louis Combes & Pascale Combes Motel, 2020. "How much does environment pay for politicians?," Working Papers halshs-01845067, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01845067
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01845067v2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01845067v2/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mohamed Boly, 2018. "CO 2 mitigation in developing countries: the role of foreign aid," Working Papers halshs-01740881, HAL.
    2. Cisneros, Elías & Kis-Katos, Krisztina & Nuryartono, Nunung, 2021. "Palm oil and the politics of deforestation in Indonesia," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    3. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios & Navas, Antonio, 2017. "Political cycles in public expenditure: butter vs guns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 582-604.
    4. Elías Cisnerosy & Krisztina Kis-Katosz & Nunung Nuryartono, 2020. "The political economy of palm oil expansion and deforestation in Indonesia," Working Papers 825, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    5. Jean Louis Combes & Christian Ebeke & Mathilde Maurel, 2015. "The effect of remittances prior to an election," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(38), pages 4074-4089, August.
    6. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2012. "Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 325-362, April.
    7. William Brock & M. Taylor, 2010. "The Green Solow model," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 127-153, June.
    8. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
    9. John A. List & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1249-1281.
    10. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, 1995. "Economic Growth and the Environment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(2), pages 353-377.
    11. Clémence Vergne, 2009. "Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries," Post-Print hal-00368509, HAL.
    12. David Roodman, 2009. "A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(1), pages 135-158, February.
    13. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    14. Hicks, Robert L. & Parks, Bradley C. & Roberts, J. Timmons & Tierney, Michael J., 2010. "Greening Aid?: Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199582792, Decembrie.
    15. Sijeong Lim & Victor Menaldo & Aseem Prakash, 2015. "Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 48(2), pages 181-205, June.
    16. Vergne, Clémence, 2009. "Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 63-77, March.
    17. Jean-Louis Combes & Pascale Combes-Motel & Somlanare Romuald Kinda, 2016. "Do Climate Mitigation Efforts Hurt Trade Performance?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 126(5), pages 947-970.
    18. Jakob Haan & Jeroen Klomp, 2013. "Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 387-410, December.
    19. Pailler, Sharon, 2018. "Re-election incentives and deforestation cycles in the Brazilian Amazon," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 345-365.
    20. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2016. "Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 79-93.
    21. Laing, Timothy, 2015. "Rights to the forest, REDD+ and elections: Mining in Guyana," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(P2), pages 250-261.
    22. Sun, Yuying & Zhang, Xun & Hong, Yongmiao & Wang, Shouyang, 2019. "Asymmetric pass-through of oil prices to gasoline prices with interval time series modelling," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 165-173.
    23. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    24. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    25. Laura Policardo, 2016. "Is Democracy Good for the Environment? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Regime Transitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(2), pages 275-300, June.
    26. Magnani, Elisabetta, 2000. "The Environmental Kuznets Curve, environmental protection policy and income distribution," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 431-443, March.
    27. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2203-2220, December.
    28. B. Mak Arvin & Byron Lew, 2009. "Foreign aid and ecological outcomes in poorer countries: an empirical analysis," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 295-299.
    29. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    30. Alessio D’Amato & Giovanni Marin & Andrea Rampa, 2019. "Environmental Disasters and Electoral Cycle: An Empirical Analysis on Floods and Landslides in Italy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(2), pages 625-651, October.
    31. Kpodar, Kangni & Abdallah, Chadi, 2017. "Dynamic fuel price pass-through: Evidence from a new global retail fuel price database," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 303-312.
    32. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    33. Michael Faye & Paul Niehaus, 2012. "Political Aid Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3516-3530, December.
    34. Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2012. "Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 295-327, December.
    35. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-1426, November.
    36. Welsch, Heinz, 2009. "Implications of happiness research for environmental economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(11), pages 2735-2742, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boly, Mohamed & Combes, Jean-Louis & Combes Motel, Pascale, 2023. "Does environment pay for politicians?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    2. Pantelis Kammas & Vassilis Sarantides, 2016. "Fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy is not “the only game in town”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 279-311, September.
    3. Collazos-Ortiz, María Antonieta & Wong, Pui-Hang, 2024. "The effects of resource rents and elections on human capital investment in Colombia," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    4. Castro, Vítor & Martins, Rodrigo, 2018. "Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: In depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 44-64.
    5. Stéphane Goutte & David Guerreiro & Bilel Sanhaji & Sophie Saglio & Julien Chevallier, 2019. "International Financial Markets," Post-Print halshs-02183053, HAL.
    6. Antoine CAZALS & Pierre MANDON, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers 201609, CERDI.
    7. García, Israel & Hayo, Bernd, 2021. "Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
    9. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01320586, HAL.
    10. Gupta, Sanjeev & Liu, Estelle X. & Mulas-Granados, Carlos, 2016. "Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 101-114.
    11. Aidt, Toke S. & Mooney, Graham, 2014. "Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902–1937," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 53-71.
    12. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2012. "Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 325-362, April.
    13. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    14. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    15. Lamar Crombach & Frank Bohn, 2024. "Uninformed voters with (im)precise expectations: Explaining political budget cycle puzzles," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 275-311, March.
    16. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    17. Janků, Jan & Libich, Jan, 2019. "Ignorance isn't bliss: Uninformed voters drive budget cycles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 21-43.
    18. Toke Aidt & Graham Mooney, 2014. "Voter suffrage and the political budget cycle: evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1401, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    19. Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Political Effects on the Allocation of Public Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 653, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    20. Klein, Fabio Alvim & Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, 2015. "Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 21-36.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CO2 emissions; Elections; Environmental policy; Panel data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01845067. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.