Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting
The main question addressed in the model regards which type of incentives an elected politician has to choose good or bad policies. In order to answer it, we focus on two inefficiencies, recently considered in the literature: the down-up problem and voters having bias beliefs and voting retrospectively. Moreover, we consider that the politician receives utility from holding office and from the success of his projects and, as to his policy platform choice; he can choose any combination of bad (yet popular) policies and good (yet less popular) policies. We are able to show that politicians can choose good long term policy platforms even when those policies have bad short term results. Motivation regarding the success of the projects or an incumbent bias tends to induce the politician to implement a good policy. Unclear responsibilities or campaign promises will have mixed effects on the type of policy implemented.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200 PORTO|
Web page: http://www.fep.up.pt/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hans Gersbach, 2004.
"Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections,"
Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
- Hans Gersbach, 2001. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series 406, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ivo Bischoff & Lars-H. Siemers, 2013. "Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 163-180, July.
- Leiser, David & Drori, Shelly, 2005. "NaIve understanding of inflation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 179-198, March.
- Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies Princeton University Press.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007.
"Political Reputations and Campaign Promises,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 846-884, 06.
- Sven Jari Stehn & Annalisa Fedelino, 2009. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System," IMF Working Papers 09/124, International Monetary Fund.
- Andrew Leigh, 2004.
"Does the World Economy Swing National Elections?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
485, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, 03.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:485. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.