Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting
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KeywordsPolicy choice; Elections; Voting behavior; Retrospective voting; Biased beliefs; Down-up problem;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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