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Flexible pensions for politicians

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach

    ()

  • Markus Müller

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2010. "Flexible pensions for politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 103-124, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:1:p:103-124
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9556-2
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9556-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Berlemann, Michael & Schmidt, Carsten, 2001. "Predictive accuracy of political stock markets: Empirical evidence from a European perspective," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,57, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    2. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
    4. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
    5. Ray C. Fair, 1996. "Econometrics and Presidential Elections," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 89-102, Summer.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    7. Bender, Bruce & Lott, John R, Jr, 1996. "Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 67-100, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Oriana Ponta, 2017. "Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 289-321, March.
    2. Alessandro Fedele & Pierpaolo Giannoccolo, 2018. "Paying Politicians: Not Too Little, Not Too Much," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS47, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Flexible pensions; Democracy; Information markets; Triple mechanism; D72; D82;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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