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A Dynamic Model of Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Arianna Degan

    (Department of Economics, University of Quebec at Montreal)

Abstract

We propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting with asymmetric information incorporating the three main factors affecting voting choices of individual citizens: party identification, policy preferences, and candidates’ valence. Using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections, we identify and estimate (1) the distribution of voters’ policy positions and (2) candidates’ valence. In addition to providing an equilibrium interpretation of the observed voting profiles and electoral outcomes, we use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual experiments to assess the relative importance of candidates’ policy positions, valence, and voters’ information on the outcomes of elections and to evaluate the performance of the electoral process.

Suggested Citation

  • Arianna Degan, 2003. "A Dynamic Model of Voting," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:04-015
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    File URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/04-015.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Himmelweit, Hilde T. & Biberian, Marianne Jaeger & Stockdale, Janet, 1978. "Memory for Past Vote: Implications of a Study of Bias in Recall," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 365-375, July.
    2. Bernhardt, M. Daniel & Ingerman, Daniel E., 1985. "Candidate reputations and the `incumbency effect'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 47-67, June.
    3. Lewis, Jeffrey B., 2001. "Estimating Voter Preference Distributions from Individual-Level Voting Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 275-297, January.
    4. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
    5. Bailey, Michael, 2001. "Ideal Point Estimation with a Small Number of Votes: A Random-Effects Approach," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 192-210, January.
    6. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156.
    7. Cooper, Alexandra & Munger, Michael C, 2000. "The (Un)Predictability of Primaries with Many Candidates: Simulation Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 337-355, June.
    8. Page, Benjamin I. & Jones, Calvin C., 1979. "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1071-1089, December.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:65:y:1971:i:02:p:389-400_13 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Enelow, James M. & Hinich, Melvin J., 1982. "Ideology, Issues, and the Spatial Theory of Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 493-501, September.
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    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:57:y:1963:i:02:p:368-377_24 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Ching-Chung Kuo, 2011. "Optimal assignment of resources to strengthen the weakest link in an uncertain environment," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 159-173, June.
    2. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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