Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects
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- Ron N. Borkovsky & Paul B. Ellickson & Brett R. Gordon & Victor Aguirregabiria & Gardete Pedro, 2014. "Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games: Challenges and Prospects," Working Papers tecipa-510, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pavel Kireyev, 2016. "Markets for Ideas: Prize Structure, Entry Limits, and the Design of Ideation Contests," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-129, Harvard Business School.
- Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2015. "Global inspection games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 59-72.
More about this item
KeywordsStatic discrete games; Dynamic games; Structural estimation; Multiplicity of equilibria; Information structures; Learning;
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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