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Working in family firms

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Breda

    (Paris School of Economics, and CNRS, France, and IZA, Germany)

Abstract

Family firms are ubiquitous in most countries. The differences in objectives, governance, and management styles between those firms and their non-family counterparts have several implications for the workforce, which scholars have only recently started to investigate. Family firms offer greater job security, employ different management practices, have a comparative advantage to avoid conflicts when employment relations are more hostile, and provide insurance to workers through implicit contracts when labor market regulation is limited. But all this also comes at a cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Breda, 2018. "Working in family firms," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 434-434, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:y:2018:n:434
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2007. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 709-751, June.
    2. Oriana Bandiera & Renata Lemos & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2018. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(5), pages 1605-1653.
    3. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(2), pages 433-466, April.
    4. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 1298-1340.
    5. Alex Bryson & Harald Dale-Olsen & Trygve Gulbrandsen, 2016. "Family ownership, Workplace Closure and the Recession," DoQSS Working Papers 16-06, Quantitative Social Science - UCL Social Research Institute, University College London.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7244 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(2), pages 433-466, April.
    8. Bach, Laurent & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas, 2015. "CEO identity and labor contracts: Evidence from CEO transitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 227-242.
    9. Holger M. Mueller & Thomas Philippon, 2011. "Family Firms and Labor Relations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 218-245, April.
    10. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    11. François Belot & Timothée Waxin, 2017. "Labor Conflicts in French Workplaces: Does (the Type of) Family Control Matter?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 591-617, December.
    12. Adams, Renée & Keloharju, Matti & Knüpfer, Samuli, 2018. "Are CEOs born leaders? Lessons from traits of a million individuals," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 392-408.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 1298-1340.
    2. Christopher Hansen & Joern Block & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2020. "Family Firm Performance Over The Business Cycle: A Meta‐Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 476-511, July.
    3. Andrea Garnero, 2015. "Workforce diversity, productivity and wages in France: the role of managers vs. the proprietary structure of the firm," Working Papers CEB 15-039, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Lemos, Renata & Scur, Daniela, 2019. "The ties that bind: implicit contracts and management practices in family-run firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Kölling, Arnd, 2017. "Employment in family firms: Less but safe? Analyzing labor demand of German family firms with a treatment model for panel data," Working Papers 92, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute of Management Berlin (IMB).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    family firms; wages; job security; working conditions; paternalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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