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Reciprocity in Labor Market Relationships: Evidence from an Experiment across High-Income OECD Countries

Listed author(s):
  • Israel Waichman

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Berheimerstr. 20, Heidelberg 69115, Germany)

  • Ch’ng Kean Siang

    ()

    (Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang 11800, Malaysia)

  • Till Requate

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Olshausenstr. 40, 24118 Kiel, Germany)

  • Aric P. Shafran

    ()

    (Department of Economics, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407, USA)

  • Eva Camacho-Cuena

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University Jaume I, Castellón 12071, Spain)

  • Yoshio Iida

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Kyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto 6038555, Japan)

  • Shosh Shahrabani

    ()

    (Department of Economics, The Max Stern Yezreel Valley College, 19300 Emek Yezreel, Israel)

We study differences in behavior across countries in a labor market context. To this end, we conducted a bilateral gift-exchange experiment comparing the behavior of subjects from five high-income OECD countries: Germany, Spain, Israel, Japan and the USA. We observe that in all countries, effort levels are increasing while rejection rates are decreasing in wage offers. However, we also find considerable differences in behavior across countries in both one-shot and repeated relationships, the most striking between Germany and Spain. We also discuss the influence of socio-economic indicators and the implications of our findings.

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Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

Volume (Year): 6 (2015)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 1-22

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Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:6:y:2015:i:4:p:473-494:d:56901
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