Optimal Policies with an Informal Sector
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Katherine Cuff & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2016. "Dual Corporate Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers dp16-12, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Adam, Antonis & Kammas, Pantelis, 2012. "(Tax evasion) power to the people: does "early democratization" increase the size of the informal sector?," MPRA Paper 43343, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos & Laudo M. Ogura, 2015. "Welfare and Inequality with Hard-to-Tax Markets," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(3), pages 371-384, September.
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- Katherine Cuff & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2017. "Shades of Grey: Business Compliance with Fiscal and Labour Regulations," Discussion Papers dp17-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
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More about this item
KeywordsH32; H26; K42; Informal Labour Market; Enforcement; Undocumented Workers; Public Good Provision;
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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