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Natural resources, governance and institutional quality: The role of resource funds

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  • Tsani, Stella

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between resource funds, governance and institutional quality in resource-rich countries. The study is motivated by the relatively recent and inconclusive debate on resource funds and on their role in the addressing of the “resource curse”. The estimation results suggest that resource funds may be associated with governance and institutional quality improvements. The analysis complements the debate on the tools of addressing the “resource curse” and on the determinants of governance and institutional quality. The findings remain important for their policy implications. The estimation results suggest that resource funds may prove useful tools in the hands of the policy makers in the attempt to address governance and institutional quality deterioration induced by resource abundance.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsani, Stella, 2013. "Natural resources, governance and institutional quality: The role of resource funds," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 181-195.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:38:y:2013:i:2:p:181-195
    DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2012.11.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Mahdi Majbouri, 2015. "Estimating the Income Counterfactual for Oil Producing Countries of the MENA Region," Working Papers 904, Economic Research Forum, revised Apr 2015.
    2. Itchoko Motande Mondjeli Mwa Ndjokou & Pierre Christian Tsopmo, 2017. "The effects on economic growth of natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does the quality of institutions matters?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 248-263.
    3. Ouoba, Youmanli, 2016. "Natural resources: Funds and economic performance of resource-rich countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 108-116.
    4. repec:bla:rdevec:v:21:y:2017:i:3:p:567-590 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Diana Patricia Niño Muñoz, 2015. "Calidad de vida y el desarrollo institucional de los municipios petroleros de Colombia (2000-2010)," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(33), pages 203-230, July-Dece.
    6. Tsani, Stella, 2015. "On the relationship between resource funds, governance and institutions: Evidence from quantile regression analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 94-111.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural resources; Resource funds; Governance; Institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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