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Balancing incentives in the compensation contracts of nonprofit hospital CEOs

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  • Preyra, Colin
  • Pink, George

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  • Preyra, Colin & Pink, George, 2001. "Balancing incentives in the compensation contracts of nonprofit hospital CEOs," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 509-525, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:20:y:2001:i:4:p:509-525
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    3. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
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    7. Sydney Ludvigson & Christina H. Paxson, 2001. "Approximation Bias In Linearized Euler Equations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 242-256.
    8. Stephen P. Zeldes, 1989. "Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 275-298.
    9. Mankiw, N Gregory, 1985. "Consumer Durables and the Real Interest Rate," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 353-362.
    10. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
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    12. Clarkson, Kenneth W, 1972. "Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 363-384, October.
    13. Mankiw, N Gregory, 1985. "Consumer Durables and the Real Interest Rate," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 353-362.
    14. Pauly, Mark V, 1987. "Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 257-262.
    15. Hirth, Richard A., 1999. "Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, pages 219-240.
    16. Blundell, Richard & M. Stoker, Thomas, 1999. "Consumption and the timing of income risk," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 475-507, March.
    17. Newhouse, Joseph P, 1970. "Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 64-74.
    18. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1981. "The permanent income hypothesis and the real interest rate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 307-311.
    19. Petersen, Trond, 1991. "Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, pages 130-158.
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    Cited by:

    1. Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco, 2014. "State intervention and the microcredit market: the role of business development services," Small Business Economics, Springer, pages 931-944.
    2. Michael KOPEL & Marco A. MARINI, 2016. "Organization And Governance In Social Economy Enterprises: An Introduction," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, pages 309-313.
    3. Hirsch, Barry & Macpherson, David A. & Preston, Anne E., 2017. "Nonprofit Wages: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 10571, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Giorgio Calcagnini & Annalisa Ferrando & Germana Giombini, 2015. "Multiple market imperfections, firm profitability and investment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, pages 95-120.
    5. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multitask incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    6. Cardinaels, Eddy, 2009. "Governance in non-for-profit hospitals: Effects of board members' remuneration and expertise on CEO compensation," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 64-75, November.
    7. Gregory E. Goering, 2007. "The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 83-91.
    8. C. Du Bois & R. Caers & M. Jegers & C. Schepers & S. De Gieter & R. Pepermans, 2004. "Agency problems and unrelated business income of non-profit organizations: an empirical analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(20), pages 2317-2326.
    9. Stijn VAN PUYVELDE & Marc JEGERS, 2016. "Heterogeneity and self-selection into nonprofit management," CIRIEC Working Papers 1603, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    10. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multidimensional incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised May 2006.
    11. Jean Bonnet & Nicolas Le Pape, 2010. "Pre Entry Motives into Entrepreneurship and Post Entry Entrepreneurial Orientation," TEPP Working Paper 2010-12, TEPP.
    12. Newton, Ashley N., 2015. "Executive compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in the absence of owners," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 195-222.
    13. Fabrizio Sarto & Corrado Cuccurullo & Massimo Aria, 2014. "Exploring healthcare governance literature: systematic review and paths for future research," MECOSAN. Menagement e economia sanitaria, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(91), pages 61-80.
    14. Michael Kopel & Marco Marini, 2012. "Optimal Compensation Structure In Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers 0512, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2012.
    15. Kathleen Carey & Avi Dor, 2008. "Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, pages 61-75.
    16. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multitask incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32-Rev., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Mar 2006.
    17. Michael Kopel & Marco Marini, 2014. "Strategic delegation in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 275-296.
    18. Monica Auteri & Richard Wagner, 2007. "The Organizational Architecture of Nonprofit Governance: Economic Calculation Within an Ecology of Enterprises," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 57-68, March.

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