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Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals

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  • Kathleen Carey
  • Avi Dor

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  • Kathleen Carey & Avi Dor, 2008. "Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 61-75, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jproda:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:61-75
    DOI: 10.1007/s11123-007-0065-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blair, Dudley W. & Placone, Dennis L., 1988. "Expense-preference behavior, agency costs, and firm organization the savings and loan industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-15, February.
    2. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 704-719, Winter.
    3. Douglas O. Staiger & Joanne Spetz & Ciaran S. Phibbs, 2010. "Is There Monopsony in the Labor Market? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 211-236, April.
    4. Angrist, Joshua D. & Krueger, Alan B., 1999. "Empirical strategies in labor economics," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 23, pages 1277-1366, Elsevier.
    5. Timothy H. Hannan & Ferdinand Mavinga, 1980. "Expense Preference and Managerial Control: the Case of the Banking Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 671-682, Autumn.
    6. Van Vliet, ReneC. J. A. & Van Praag, Bernard M. S., 1987. "Health status estimation on the basis of MIMIC-health care models," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 27-42, March.
    7. Preyra, Colin & Pink, George, 2001. "Balancing incentives in the compensation contracts of nonprofit hospital CEOs," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 509-525, July.
    8. Hirsch, Barry T. & Schumacher, Edward J., 1995. "Monopsony power and relative wages in the labor market for nurses," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 443-476, October.
    9. Awh, Robert Y & Primeaux, Walter J, Jr, 1985. "Managerial Discretion and Expense Preference Behavior," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(2), pages 224-231, May.
    10. Roomkin, Myron J & Weisbrod, Burton A, 1999. "Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 750-781, October.
    11. Rajeev H. Dehejia & Sadek Wahba, 2002. "Propensity Score-Matching Methods For Nonexperimental Causal Studies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 151-161, February.
    12. Brickley, James A & Van Horn, R Lawrence, 2002. "Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 227-249, April.
    13. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Expense preference; Hospitals; Contract management; D24; L24;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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