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State Intervention and the (Micro)Credit Market in Developed Countries: Loan Guarantee and Business Development Services

Author

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  • Renaud Bourlès

    () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

  • Anastasia Cozarenco

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

Abstract

We analyze in this paper how various forms of State intervention can impact the microcredit market in developed countries. Using a simple model where entrepreneurs borrow without collateral, we study the effect of different policies on microfinance institutions' lending behavior. We first introduce state intervention through the loan guarantee and show that, not surprisingly, it increases the number of entrepreneurs receiving a loan. However, after modeling business development services provided by the microfinance institution, we show that the government loan guarantee can have a counterproductive effect by reducing the number of entrepreneurs benefiting from such services. We therefore analyze an alternative policy: the subsidization of business development services by the State. We then provide a condition under which - for fixed government expenditures - such subsidies are more effective (in terms of outreach) than loan guarantees.

Suggested Citation

  • Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco, 2013. "State Intervention and the (Micro)Credit Market in Developed Countries: Loan Guarantee and Business Development Services," Working Papers halshs-00811191, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00811191
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00811191
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco & Dominique Henriet & Xavier Joutard, 2015. "Business Training Allocation and Credit Scoring: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France," Working Papers halshs-01171949, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    microcredit; loan guarantee; business development services; microfinance institution;

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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