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The fast track IPO – Success factors for taking firms public with SPACs

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  • Cumming, Douglas
  • Haß, Lars Helge
  • Schweizer, Denis

Abstract

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are shells initiated with the sole intent of acquiring a single privately held company. SPAC shareholders vote on this acquisition, and in this paper we identify the factors that affect approval probability. Surprisingly, the data indicate more experienced managers and boards do not enhance the probability of deal approval. Similarly, glamor underwriters and larger underwriter syndicates are less likely to be associated with successful SPACs. Further, we find a negative relation between the presence of active investor (hedge funds and private equity funds) shareholdings in a SPAC and approval probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Cumming, Douglas & Haß, Lars Helge & Schweizer, Denis, 2014. "The fast track IPO – Success factors for taking firms public with SPACs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 198-213.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:47:y:2014:i:c:p:198-213
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.07.003
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:tefoso:v:127:y:2018:i:c:p:141-153 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Shachmurove, Yochanan & Vulanovic, Milos, 2017. "U.S. SPACs with a focus on China," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 1-18.
    3. Dimitrova, Lora, 2017. "Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 99-120.
    4. Vismara, Silvio & Signori, Andrea & Paleari, Stefano, 2015. "Changes in underwriters' selection of comparable firms pre- and post-IPO: Same bank, same company, different peers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 235-250.
    5. Kolb, Johannes & Tykvová, Tereza, 2016. "Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 80-96.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC); Ownership structure; Board structure; Voting;

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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