IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v92y2024ics1057521923005707.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sponsor reputation and agency conflicts in SPACs

Author

Listed:
  • Del Giudice, Alfonso
  • Signori, Andrea

Abstract

We investigate the agency conflict between sponsors and investors in Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) and the role of sponsor reputation in such conflict. We find that the effect of reputation depends on whether sponsors are repeat or occasional players in financial markets. SPACs sponsored by private equity firms, who face reputational concerns due to frequent interactions with investors, conduct a more virtuous target selection process as they are less likely to merge but post-merger returns are significantly better. On the other hand, former executives of renowned companies who occasionally launch SPACs make deals more lucrative to themselves, with no benefits to investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Del Giudice, Alfonso & Signori, Andrea, 2024. "Sponsor reputation and agency conflicts in SPACs," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:92:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923005707
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103054
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521923005707
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103054?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Special purpose acquisition company; SPAC; Sponsors; Reputation; IPO; Agency conflicts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:92:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923005707. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.