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Dilemas sociales de la pesca en el pacífico colombiano: un análisis desde la teoría de juegos

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  • José Santiago Arroyo Mina

Abstract

Este documento centra su análisis en el estudio de las normas sociales de la población dedicada a la extracción del recurso natural pesca, en el pacífico colombiano. Para tal efecto, se plantea un juego no cooperativo con información completa imperfecta entre la comunidad de pescadores de la zona y propietarios de los centros de acopio, que responde a los supuestos de la elección racional de los agentes, esbozados en la escuela neoclásica. El aporte de este documento consiste en caracterizar y modelar el fenómeno del intercambio directo de especies provenientes de una pesca ilegal; dentro un marco metodológico de teoría de juegos, y contrastar las condiciones de un Equilibrio de Nash para tal interacción estratégica.

Suggested Citation

  • José Santiago Arroyo Mina, 2012. "Dilemas sociales de la pesca en el pacífico colombiano: un análisis desde la teoría de juegos," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000180:011699
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Recursos naturales; pesca; racionalidad; equilibrio de Nash;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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